The Legal Framework of Countervailing Under WTO Laws

  • Abd Almohsen Alajmy LLM Candidate, Georgetown Law School
الكلمات المفتاحية: WTO, Currency, Manipulation, Countervailing

الملخص

Currency manipulation has been a long-discussed topic in international trade law. Back in the 1980s, one big topic in international trade was US dollar's overvaluation and Japanese yen's undervaluation, which was resolved after the Plaza Accord in 1985.[1] Around 2010, Chinese yuan's undervaluation because of currency manipulation became a huge issue in the US.

Therefore, this paper will examine whether there is a venue to take some limited measures to counter currency manipulation under current WTO rules.

 

[1] https://www.bruegel.org/2019/05/will-chinas-trade-war-with-the-us-end-like-that-of-japan-in-the-1980s/

المراجع

1. https://www.bruegel.org/2019/05/will-chinas-trade-war-with-the-us-end-like-that-of-japan-in-the-1980s/
2. https://www.bruegel.org/2019/05/will-chinas-trade-war-with-the-us-end-like-that-of-japan-in-the-1980s/
3. John, Magnus, and Timothy C. Brightbill. "China’s Currency Regime Is Legitimately Challengeable as a Subsidy Under ASCM Rules." The US-Sino Currency Dispute: New Insights from Economics, Politics and Law, Simon Everett (ed.), London: Center for Economic Policy Research (2010): 147-155;
4. Benjamin Blase Caryl, Is China's Currency Regime a Countervailable Subsidy - A Legal Analysis under the World Trade Organization's SCM Agreement, 45 J. World Trade 187 (2011);
5. Daniel C. K. Chow, Can the United States Impose Trade Sanctions on China for Currency Manipulation, 16 Wash. U. GLOBAL Stud. L. REV. 295 (2017); Aluisio de Lima-Campos & Juan Antonio Gaviria, Case for Misaligned Currencies as Countervailable Subsidies, A, 46 J. World Trade 1017 (2012). Though the last one argues that its analysis applies to cases other than China, it seems to assume a regime of managed float like China before 2014.
6. Staiger, Robert W., and Alan O. Sykes. "‘Currency manipulation’and world trade." World Trade Review 9.4 (2010): 583-627.
7. https://www.kbrfx.com/terms/definition/spot-transaction
8. https://www.kbrfx.com/terms/definition/Futures
9. Hong Kong’s case. https://www.mizuho-ri.co.jp/publication/research/pdf/asia-insight/asia-insight050819.pdf
10. Hong Kong. https://www.mizuho-ri.co.jp/publication/research/pdf/asia-insight/asia-insight050819.pdf
11. https://www.mizuho-ri.co.jp/publication/research/pdf/asia-insight/asia-insight050819.pdf
12. USDOC, Preliminary Decision Memorandum, case C-552-829, at 21
13. See John, Magnus, and Timothy C. Brightbill, p.1
14. https://www.jetro.go.jp/world/asia/cn/trade_04.html
15. https://www.jetro.go.jp/world/asia/cn/trade_04.html
16. Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), para. 614
17. Panel Report, US – Exports Restraints, paras. 8.65 and 8.73.
18. Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, para. 90.
19. Daniel C. K. Chow, Can the United States Impose Trade Sanctions on China for Currency
20. Manipulation, 16 Wash. U. GLOBAL Stud. L. REV. 295 (2017). But no source is cited for this assertion.
21. Aluisio de Lima-Campos & Juan Antonio Gaviria, at 1028
22. Appellate Body Report, EC – Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment
23. China GOES? Look at Peter Van den Bossche, at 1156.
24. Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), para. 614.
25. Cf. “'funds' in Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) encompasses not only 'money' but also financial resources and other financial claims more generally.”, debt-to-equity swaps and debt-forgiveness are included
26. Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber III, para 7.22-7.23.
27. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/monpol.htm
28. https://www.federalreserveeducation.org/about-the-fed/structure-and-functions/monetary-policy
29. Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), paras. 317-318.
30. Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), paras. 317-318.
31. Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), para 356
32. Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.5 – China), para. 5.100.
33. USDOC, Preliminary Decision Memorandum, case C-552-829
34. Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMs, para. 116.
35. Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMs, para. 115. *double check the source of latter half
36. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, para. 157.
37. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para. 157
38. Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), para. 4.156.
39. Chinese RMB has an offshore Hong-Kong market.
40. Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para. 143.
41. Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para. 143.
42. China GOES? Panel did not reject MOFCOM’s “subsidies to electricity” argument?
43. John, Magnus, and Timothy C. Brightbill.
44. ASCM Note 4.
45. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft
46. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, para. 171.
47. Panel Report, Australia – Automotive Leather II, para. 9.55. See also WTO Analytical Index
48. Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 1046.
49. Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 1047.
منشور
2022-09-19
كيفية الاقتباس
Abd Almohsen Alajmy. (2022). The Legal Framework of Countervailing Under WTO Laws. المجلة الدولية للعلوم الإنسانية والاجتماعية, (37), 191-211. https://doi.org/10.33193/IJoHSS.37.2022.462
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